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Abstract
This paper provides a theory of two-sided market dynamics with arguably
better microfoundations. These alternative microfoundations focus on observ-
able heterogeneities of both sides of the market in a competitive framework.
The theory is rich in empirical predictions and is less dependent on a particular
form of imperfect competition than other approaches. Our ﬁndings in the pay-
ment card example point to adoption costs and the distribution of consumer
incomes and ﬁrm sizes as the key determinants of the shares of costs borne by
each side. This result provides clear implications for industry dynamics and
sheds light on the puzzle of asymmetric pricing.
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11 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The model of two-sided markets adds an important new chapter in the ﬁeld of indus-
trial organization. Researchers have applied the model to payment markets, media
and advertising markets, dating clubs, game system markets, and many others. The
common microfoundations of most of the models of two-sided markets include het-
erogeneity of preferences, imperfect competition, and adoption costs on only one side
of the market. We oﬀer an alternative, arguably better, set of microfoundations for
the two-sided market model. We apply this approach to payment cards and illustrate
the industry dynamics. This exercise oﬀers many empirically testable hypotheses to
explain the evolution of interchange fees in various countries.
Of most note, our motivation for the heterogeneity of demands on the two sides
of the market focuses on empirically observable variables. This contrasts with the
standard approach of assuming a heterogeneous distribution of unobservable "con-
venience beneﬁts" from the use of a payment card for both sides of the market. In
this regard, the standard approach can be thought of as a reduced form of a model
such as ours. For example, in modelling the demand for payment cards we posit
that consumers face both an adoption costs and a variable fee for use of a payment
card. For high-income consumers, adopting the card can yield cost savings. As a
result, demand for payment cards by consumers is heterogeneous because consumer
i n c o m e sa r eh e t e r o g e n e o u s .O nt h em e r c h a n ts i d eo ft h ep a y m e n tm a r k e tw ea g a i n
posit that the merchant faces ﬁxed adoption costs and variable fees for use. These
conditions suggest that larger merchants will ﬁnd adoption more economical than
smaller merchants; the size distribution of ﬁrms, a distribution determined by tech-
nological considerations of costs of entry, economies of scale, and the preferences of
2consumers, is the empirical distribution that yields demand heterogeneity on this side
of the market.
Our emphasis on heterogeneity in endowments and technology yields more em-
pirically testable hypotheses than the assumption of unobservable heterogeneity in
preferences. As we will discuss, the basic empirical predictions of our approach are
broadly consistent with industry evidence, and would not be generated in the more
standard approach without additional assumptions on the nature of preferences. Fur-
thermore, the approach can be applied to other two-sided market contexts. Consider
dating clubs, for example. Rather than to assume that men and women have system-
atically diﬀerent preferences for dates or matches, our approach would be to assume
common preferences for dating matches for both men and women. Heterogeneity of
population, income, and physical features such as height, among men and women
w o u l dt h e na ﬀect the determination of the prices for admission to the dating club in
a particular market. We are conﬁdent that this approach is more fruitful empirically,
requires fewer ancillary assumptions on the form of preferences, and is more economic
in its approach, in which diﬀering incentives, rather than diﬀering preferences, explain
heterogeneous behavior.
Another feature of our model that allows us to more easily investigate the dy-
namics of two-sided markets is the assumption of adoption costs on both sides of
the market. This assumption yields an important beneﬁt, namely, it allows us to
use a contestable market structure among merchants. The beneﬁts of employing a
contestable model is that it is a more applicable model to many industries than any
particular model of imperfect competition. In a particular application, a model of
imperfect competition might be more apposite, but for a generalized purpose, the
contestable market model is more parsimonious.
In the payment card context, it has previously been pointed out (Wright (2003))
3that a merchant accepting both cards and cash and who is subject to competition
from specialized merchants accepting only cash or cards, would be competed out of
business. The contestable, or competitive market, structure that we employ allows for
the entry, or the threat of entry, from specialized merchants—those who accept only
cash, for example, or price their product higher than a cash-only merchant would to
attract only card customers. However, we ﬁnd that large merchants who accept both
cash and payment cards do survive the threat of entry from specialized merchants.
They survive the threat of entry because of the presence of adoption costs of cards.
Because the adoption costs can be spread over a large number of transactions, and
because the variable fees of card use are less than the variable costs of handling
cash, the large merchants who adopt cards can oﬀer lower prices than a cash-only
specialized merchant.
Based on the contestability of the market and on payment card adoption costs,
our equilibrium is then characterized by two thresholds in merchant size. Large mer-
chants adopt payment cards and set a price that is lower than cash customers would
experience at a cash-only merchants. So the large merchants attract customers who
pay with either cash or the card. Medium size merchants, in contrast, are specialized.
Some of these merchants accept only cash. The others adopt cards, but set a price
that is higher than the competing cash-only merchants. They attract only consumers
that use cards, because those consumers are better-oﬀ paying the higher price using
their card, because cards are cost-saving to them overall. Finally, small merchants
are all cash-only merchants. In other applications, such as game systems, for example,
this pattern of equilibrium adoption and pricing by merchants would result in large
game system writers oﬀering games that can be used on alternate systems, medium
size ones tending to specialize in one game system or another, and small ﬁrms writing
games that can be used on the system with the lowest adoption costs.
4Our assumption that yields two-sided markets is the assumption that merchants
who adopt cards cannot price discriminate based on the consumer’s choice of payment
method—often called "price coherence." This assumption is a common one in the
payment card literature. A restriction on price discrimination is used in many areas
of economics, and is an empirically testable assumption.
T u r n i n gt oo u rs p e c i ﬁc payment card example, this approach to modeling the
adoption of payment devices results in a model of a two-sided market. However, it
stands in contrast to much of the literature regarding payment devices, with the no-
table exceptions of Farrell (2006) and Rochet and Tirole (2006). In the more standard
approach to modeling payment device markets in the two-sided market literature, as
in Baxter (1983), Rochet and Tirole (2000), Schmalensee (2002), and Wright (2003),
consumers and merchants derive beneﬁts bc and bm, respectively, from their use of a
particular payment device. Under conditions that lead to two-sided markets (Rochet
and Tirole (1999)) interchange fees then play a role in balancing the demands on the
two sides of the markets for some objective, either to maximize transaction volume
(welfare) or to maximize the proﬁts of the provider of the payment device. This mod-
eling technique has the merchants and consumers in essentially symmetric positions,
both having direct demands for the payment device.
In the now standard approach, the consumer’s beneﬁt from the use of the card,
bc, is referred to as the convenience beneﬁt from the payment device. In contrast,
our approach looks at consumers as deriving utility from their consumption of goods
which they purchase subject to an income constraint. The payment method the
consumer uses does not yield utility directly, but instead imposes a frictional cost
on their purchases. The standard models are only partially applicable to payment
devices, and only so when the payment device, such as a payment card, oﬀers some
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Figure 1: Household Credit Card Adoption by Income Quintile
transfers. In contrast, the model we explore ignores any nonmonetary characteristic
of the payment device, and examines adoption and use in the environment in which
the monetary characteristics of payment devices are their only raison d’b etre.
This approach yields clear empirically relevant hypotheses. For consumers, con-
sider the introduction of a payment device with a high ﬁxed but low variable cost of
use. More aﬄuent consumers, with higher levels of consumption and purchases, will
choose to adopt the device prior to less aﬄuent consumers. For merchants, facing
a similar adoption decision, the larger merchants, or those who sell a higher valued
good, will adopt the device earlier than other merchants. These predictions are con-
sistent with empirical evidence (Figure 1 and 2)1. In contrast, the literature that
overlooks the monetary nature of payment devices does not yield such straightfor-




































Figure 2: Payment Card Share of Transaction Volume by Merchant Type
ward empirical conclusions without additional assumptions about how the speciﬁc
convenience beneﬁts are distributed among consumers and merchants.
By focusing on the moneyness of payment devices, we might be criticized for over-
looking nonmonetary beneﬁts consumers or merchants might derive from their use.
We oﬀer three defences. First, the monetary nature of payment devices is arguably
their primary purpose. Second, many convenience beneﬁts of payment devices (e.g.
protect from theft or time saving), are closely related with the income and spending
of the consumer, and are therefore better captured by our model through the vari-
able cost of use of the payment device. Third, it may be appropriate to model both
the monetary and other, direct, beneﬁts of a payment device. But we believe that
only by ﬁrst investigating the adoption pattern of a monetary payment device can we
understand the circumstances under which sellers of payment devices will choose to
7employ a strategy of tying a direct beneﬁt( n o tr e l a t e dt ot h ei n c o m eo ft h ec o n s u m e r )
to the use of the device, and determining on which side of the market those beneﬁts
might be oﬀered. By overlooking the monetary nature of payment devices, one is apt
to misunderstand the basic asymmetry between the economic roles of the consumer
and the merchant.
1.2 A New Approach
We model the consumers as having generalized Cobb-Douglas preferences across a
range of goods. They take prices as given. Each consumer is endowed with income,
which is distributed across the population of consumers according to known cumu-
lative distribution function. The merchants i d eo fo u rm o d e li sq u i t es t y l i z e d .E a c h
merchant competes in a contestable market for the single good the merchant sells,
and prices are set at the zero proﬁt level. The size of an individual merchant is hence
tied to the consumers’ demand.
Consumers and merchants are both presented with the option to adopt a new
payment device that oﬀers a lower variable cost of use, but a higher ﬁxed cost relative
to the pre-existing alternative. They each make their optimal adoption decision
taking the other’s choice as given. The model yields a two-sided market, given the
heterogeneity of consumer incomes and merchant sizes and under price coherence
of merchants that accept both payment devices. We then examine the adoption
decisions under various market structures for the provision of the payment device,
including a competitive (zero-proﬁt) market structure in which no interchange fees
are feasible, a competitive (or zero-proﬁt) structure in which interchange fees are
feasible, a monopoly structure, and the solution that would be determined by a
Ramsey social planner. Our analyses show that consumer income, adoption cost, and
8market structure each play important roles in determining the pricing and usage of
payment devices. Moreover, we ﬁnd that no market structure yields the planner’s
solution, in contrast with some previous literature, including Schmalensee (2002).
Our model can be readily applied to the payment card industry. It suggests that
both the increasing concentration of payment card networks and the growth of con-
sumer incomes relative to card service costs may help explain the puzzles surrounding
interchange fees pointed out in Hayashi (2005) and Weiner and Wright (2005). Here,
it is worth emphasizing the diﬀerences between our model and others. The exist-
ing studies on payment card market typically assume imperfect competition among
merchants, e.g. Hotelling competition. Those models allow the merchants to behave
strategically and consider the business stealing motive for adopting payment cards,
but can not easily keep track of industry dynamics. In contrast, our model assumes
competitive merchants and highlights the positive and normative consequences of
market structure, income growth, and adoption costs in a nonstrategic (merchant)
environment. The richness of the strategic approach is sacriﬁced in favor of a focus
on the interplay between individual ﬁrm and consumer decision-making and aggre-
gate industry characteristics. As a result, our model provides a convenient framework
to study evolution of payment card industry both in the short run (illustrating the
network “chicken-egg” dynamics) and long-run (illustrating adoption and pricing dy-
namics due to cost and income changes), and oﬀers some further insights into the
related competitive policy issues.
The modelling approach we’ve laid out in this paper is applicable to other in-
dustries. By focusing on distributions of endowments and ﬁrm size and by placing
the economic interaction among agents in the model in a contestable environment,
this approach is potentially more fruitful in empirical measurement and hypothesis
testing.
91.3 Road Map
In the next section we lay out our model in greater detail and derive some preliminary
results. In section 3 we review numerical analyses of the equilibria of our model, and
apply our ﬁndings to the interchange fee puzzles of payment cards. In section 4 we
oﬀer concluding remarks and suggestions for future research.
2T h e M o d e l
Here we present our model to study pricing and adoption of monetary payment de-
vices. We ﬁr s tl a yo u tt h ee n v i r o n m e n ti nw h i c ho n l yo n ep a y m e n td e v i c e ,w h i c hw e
refer to as cash, is in use. Later we will consider the introduction of an alternative
device, which we refer to as a payment card.
2.1 Pre-card Market Environment
The economy is composed of a continuum of merchants. Each merchant locates in
a physical store and sells a distinct product α. The store facility is sunk and each
product market is contestable, so merchants always sell at cost:
(1 − τm)pα = cα =⇒ pα =
cα
1 − τm
where pα and cα are price and cost for good α respectively; τm is the cash payment
cost to the merchant. The cost of the cash payment includes the handling, storage,
and safekeeping costs the merchant expends in accepting cash.
A consumer has generalized Cobb-Douglas preference. She would like to consume








10where α ∈ [α, α] is the preference parameter distributed with cdf G(α), xα,I is her
quantity of demand for good α, τc is the cost of a cash payment to the consumer.
As with the merchant, the consumer faces costs in handling and transporting cash.








Across consumers, the income I ∈ [I,I] is distributed with cdf function F(I) and
mean E(I). Normalize the aggregate measure of consumer to be unity. At equilib-
rium, market supply equals demand, so the market output and value for product α







2.2 Card Adoption and Market Equilibrium
At time T, a payment innovation, e.g., a card, is introduced. The card service is
provided by a card network, who charges merchants and consumers a proportional
fee fm and fc respectively. The costs of providing the card service to merchants
and consumers are dm and dc, respectively. For merchants and consumers, there is a
per-period adoption cost km (e.g., a ﬁxed cost of renting card-processing equipment)
and kc (e.g., a ﬁxed cost of maintaining banking account balance or credit score). At
equilibrium, large merchants and wealthy consumers have an advantage in adopting
the payment card. To see that, let us construct the following equilibrium: given that
merchants α ≥ α0 accept the card, consumers of income I ≥ I0 would like to adopt
the card, and vice versa.
112.2.1 Merchants’ Choice
Merchants take consumers’ card adoption as given to make their card acceptance
decision. Due to competition in the contestable market, they fall into three categories
based on their transaction volume: (1) Large merchants (α ≥ α1)a c c e p tc a r da n d
charge price pα,d ≤ pα,c so that they are patronized by both card and cash customers;
( 2 )I n t e r m e d i a t em e r c h a n t s( α0 ≤ α<α 1) specialize. They either accept card and
charge pα,d,w h e r e1+τc
1+fcpα,c ≥ pα,d >p α,c, so that they are patronized only by card
customers, or they do not accept card and charge pα,c so that they only serve cash
customers. (3) Small merchants (α<α 0) do not accept card and charge pα,c,s ot h a t
all customers shop there with cash.
Category (1): α ≥ α1 To elaborate on this, let’s start with the ﬁrst category.















Contestability requires zero proﬁt so that revenue equals cost,
(1 − fm)pα,dx
card






α,d + km (2)









1+fc +( 1− τm)
α[EI<I0(I)]
1+τc − kmE(α)
Given pα,d ≤ pα,c = cα
1−τm, am e r c h a n th a st ob el a r g ee n o u g ht ob ei nt h i sc a t e g o r y ,








12Category (2): α0 ≤ α<α 1 Merchants in this intermediate group specialize. For
each product, there are two merchants. One accepts card and charges pα,d,w h e r e
1+τc
1+fcpα,c ≥ pα,d >p α,c, so that it is patronized only by card customers. The other
does not accept card and charge pα,c so that it only serves cash customers.










1+fcpα,c ≥ pα,d >p α,c implies that merchants with α0 ≤ α<α 1 are in







Category (3): α<α 0 Small merchants with α<α 0 a r ei nt h et h i r dc a t e g o r y .
Given their small transaction volumes, accepting card will result pα,d > 1+τc
1+fcpα,c.
Therefore, all customers shop there with cash.
This arrangement of prices and shopping patterns suggests that diﬀerent eco-
nomics are at play than in other models of card adoption, for example Rochet and
Tirole (2006). In this equilibrium we’ll ﬁnd that for every card-adopting merchant,
the merchant prefers the use of the card by the consumer to the use of cash, both on
an ex ante and ex post basis. Merchants who ﬁnd card transactions more costly than
cash transactions either charge higher prices that compensate for the higher cost or
decline to accept cards.
2.2.2 Consumers’ Choice
An individual consumer takes market prices and merchants’ card acceptance as given
to make her own adoption decision. Given that merchants α ≥ α0 accept the card,
13she compares the utility of adopting card or not. An adopter who enjoys higher utility











































Equation 4 suggests that for any individual consumer to adopt card, we need
τc >f c
and the adopters’ income has to be over the threshold level I0










As discussed, the interrelationship between consumers’ card adoption and merchants’


















α[EI>I0(I − kc)](1 − τm)



































(1 − fm)α − (1 + fc)α0Z0

















We are now ready to discuss equilibrium outcomes under four alternative payment
market structures as follows.
(1) Competitive Network without Interchange Fee First, in a competitive
card service market where it is not feasible to assess an interchange fee, we have
fm = dm and fc = dc




15(2) Competitive Network with Interchange Fee If charging an interchange
fee is feasible, a competitive card network (e.g., a non-proﬁt bank association) can
achieve more card transactions. The interchange fee would be deﬁned as the transfer
from merchants to consumers in the amount fm −dm = −(fc −dc) The network will
have the following objective and constraints in setting the merchant and consumer





s.t. Equations 9 − 10; fm + fc = dc + dm
(3) Monopoly Network A monopoly card network would like to maximize the





(fc + fm − dm − dc)
s.t. Equations 9 − 10
(4) Social Planner The social planner would like to maximize the social surplus of
u s i n gam o r ee ﬃcient payment device, taking into account the adoption costs of con-
sumers and merchants, and subject to the incentive constraints of both. In addition,










Eα<α0(α)(EI>I0(I) − EI>I0(I − kc))
E(α)(1 + τc)
(τm + τc) − (1 − G(α0))km − (1 − F(I0))kc
16s.t. Equations 9 − 10; fm + fc ≥ dc + dm
3 Numerical Analysis
To better illustrate our ﬁndings, we consider an explicit example as follows.
Assume α ∈ (0,1) is uniformly distributed2 with E(α)=1 /2,a n dI ∈ [0,∞)




2 and EI>I0(I − kc)=e−λI0(1
λ + I0 − kc). Therefore, Equations 9-10
































). A detailed proof of
L2 is provided in the Appendix.
3.1 Short-run (Transitional) Dynamics













2The numerical analysis is not sensitive to the distribution of ﬁrm size. In the Appendix, we
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Figure 3: Interaction of Merchants and Consumers in Card Adoption





















Figure 3 illustrates the interactions of card adoption between merchants and con-
sumers and the corresponding transitional dynamics. There exist two steady states
with positive levels of adoption (the no adoption outcome is a steady state as well): a
high-adoption equilibrium (I∗
0,α∗





equilibrium is stable but the low equilibrium is not. As a result, the card network has
incentive to push the card adoption to overcome the low equilibrium. Our analysis
suggests if the initial card adoption is high enough, the market will achieve the high
equilibrium. Otherwise, card adoption may fail, and suﬀer no adoption.
183.2 Long-run Dynamics
Using the high-adoption equilibrium, we can numerically compare the long-run in-
dustry dynamics under four diﬀerent market structures. For the benchmark sim-
ulation, we use the following parameterization: τm =0 .05,τ c =0 .05,d c < 0.05,
dm < 0.05,k c =1 2 5 ,k m =1 2 5 ,λ=0 .0001. B a s e do nt h a t ,w ep l o tF i g u r e s4-
7 corresponding to each market structure. To study the comparative dynamics, we
then adjust the values of kc,k m and λ to see the eﬀects of changing consumer income
and adoption costs on card pricing and usage (results are shown in the Appendix).
In addition, we examine the outcome under an exponential distribution of ﬁrm size.
That allows to examine the outcome under identical distributions of income and ﬁrm
size.
3.2.1 Competitive Card Network without Interchange Fee
If it is not feasible for the competitive card network to set an interchange fee (other
than zero), merchants and consumers will face their respective card service costs:
fm = dm and fc = dc













and the corresponding card transaction volume is
e(−λI0)(1
λ + I0 − kc)(1 − α2
0)
(1 + dc)
3.2.2 Competitive Card Network with Interchange Fee
If the competitive card network can set an interchange fee, then only the sum of
card service costs dm + dc matters. Therefore, the card network achieves better cost
19Figure 4: Card Fees and Transaction Volume
Figure 5: Cost Allocation and Card Transaction Volume
























dm + dc = fc + fm
3.2.3 Monopoly Card Network

























The social planner maximizes the social surplus subject to the incentive constraints























(τm + τc) − e
(−λI0)kc − (1 − α0)km
21Figure 6: Card Fees and Monopoly Proﬁts













fm + fc ≥ dc + dm
3.3 Findings
As shown, a competitive card network, a monopoly card network, and the Ramsey
planner each solves a diﬀerent problem. The resulting market outcomes and compet-
itive dynamics are well illustrated with our simulations (see attached ﬁgures in the
Appendix).
Our major ﬁndings are:
• At a given total cost dm + dc, the monopoly network chooses the highest price
level, (fm + fc), and, correspondingly, the lowest card adoption and usage; the
competitive network chooses the highest interchange fees (the greatest diﬀerence
between merchant and consumer prices), resulting in the highest card adoption
and usage. The Ramsey planner chooses fees that are lower than the monopoly
fees, and imply lower interchange fees than the competitive network, and which
result in less adoption and card use than the competitive network. Because the
competitive network does not take into account the adoption costs of merchants
and consumers, it results in excessive adoption of cards from a social point of
view.
23• As the total cost dm + dc declines, all three market structures, competitive,
monopoly and the Ramsey planner, choose decreasing fees fm + fc and generate
more card adoption and transactions. However, the monopoly network has the
smallest fee reduction.
• The cost allocation tends to be diﬀerent under diﬀerent market structures. As
s h o w ni ns i m u l a t i o n1 ,w i t has y m m e t r i ca d o p t i o nc o s tkm and kc, the monopoly
charges the most similar fees to both merchants and consumers, the competitive
network charges the most divergent fees to merchants than consumers, while the
Ramsey planner charges fees than are intermediate, in their degree of divergence,
relative to the other network structures.
This is a key result and worth considering further. Consider the move from a
competitive card industry structure to a monopoly one for a given level of total
costs. We observe that the monopoly tends to raise prices more on consumers.
Why is this? The intuition for this result can be understood by considering the
ﬁrst-order eﬀects from the card-provider’s optimization conditions. Consider,
in the move from a competitive card-industry to a monopoly card-industry
with a marginal increase in merchant fees and no change in consumer fees.
The loss in revenue from transactions will consist of all the income from cards
in the marginal store (that declines card acceptance after the price increase).
Alternatively, consider a marginal increase in consumer fees and no change in
merchant fees. The loss in revenue will consist of the loss from the marginal
(low-income) consumer’s transactions in all stores. Under the assumption of a
more highly skewed distribution of income than ﬁrm size, the former loss is
greater for the monopolist than the latter, so the monopolist tends to raise
consumer fees relative to the competitive ﬁr m .F o rt h em o v ef r o map r i v a t e
24organization of industry to the Ramsey planner, the planner, in addition to
valuing the card transaction, values the beneﬁts from displaced high-cost cash
transactions (the alternative payment device) and, at the same time, wishes to
minimize adoption costs. It tends to more heavily weight a decrease in merchant
fees more than a decrease in consumer fees because by lowering the merchant’s
fees, which leads to the adoption of the device by additional merchants, the
social planner can displace the existing cash transactions in those additional
merchants by the amount of the existing users of the device (without increasing
any consumer’s adoption costs). This is a bigger eﬀect, given the distribution
of income and ﬁrm sizes, than would be a relative decrease in consumer fees.
• As consumer incomes rise relative to card service costs (e.g., total costs of card
provision may decrease with technological progress or consumer incomes may
increase with economic growth), consumer fees tend to be increased relative
to merchant fees. This can be understood as attempting to achieve a higher
penetration rate over time, which given our income and ﬁrm-size distributions,
lead to greater use of cards than would be to lower merchant fees. With
an exponential distribution of income and a uniform distribution of ﬁrm size,
there is a greater mass of potential transactions, as costs fall or incomes rise, in
pushing consumer, rather than merchant adoption. This result is robust under
all three diﬀerent market structures.
• When we examine distributions of income and ﬁrm size that are equally skewed
(and both are exponential distributions), we ﬁnd that card adoption and trans-
action volumes fall. Consider the Ramsey planner: with an equally skewed
distribution of income and ﬁrm size, the planner can achieve more card trans-
actions by setting prices to induce the larger merchants and the higher income
25consumers to adopt cards, while sparing the smaller merchants and lower in-
come consumers from incurring the adoption costs of cards (relative to the case
in which ﬁrm size is less highly skewed). In both the competitive and monopoly
networks we ﬁnd that the divergence between consumer and merchant fees
increases as the size distribution of the merchant becomes more skewed and
matches that of the income distribution.
• The fee allocation is inﬂuenced by the adoption cost km and kc so that the party
having a higher card adoption cost tends to bear a lower card service fee (as
shown in simulations 2 and 3). This result is robust under all three diﬀerent
market structures.
• The simulations show that using identical distributions for income and ﬁrm
size do not alter the results drastically. Both distributions were assumed to be
exponential distributions, which are quite skewed. The general result as we
change the ﬁrm size distribution from a uniform to an exponential distribution
is that merchants pay higher prices (and consumers lower prices) in both the
competitive and monopoly cases, resulting in fewer (but larger) ﬁrms adopting
cards. Consumer adoption and card transaction volume are little changed,
however. An implication is that in markets that have more highly skewed
distributions of merchants, we can expect higher interchange fees. These results
point out that there are fundamental asymmetries between the merchants and
consumers in our model that drive, to a considerable extent, the equilibrium
pricing patterns. These asymmetries are built into our economic model in that
the consumer does not have a direct utility for card use, while cards are a direct
input for the merchant; in other words, the asymmetries are present because of
the economic roles played by consumer and merchant.
263.3.1 Applications: Interchange Fee Puzzles
Our model provides a general framework to study the pricing, adoption and usage
of payment devices. When applied to the payment card, it sheds lights on several
puzzles surrounding the payment card interchange fees.
First, for some payment card systems (e.g., debit cards in the U.S.), why did the
interchange fees ﬂow from consumers to merchants in the early years only to have the
direction reversed more recently? More generally, why have interchange fees increased
in recent years?
As total costs of card provision is decreased, as would occur with technological
progress, our model suggests that fees would decrease relatively for consumers. As we
explained earlier, this can be understood as attempting to achieve a higher penetra-
tion rate over time, which given our income and ﬁrm-size distributions, lead to greater
use of cards than would be to lower merchant fees. With the more-skewed income
distribution, there is a greater mass of potential transactions, as costs fall, in pushing
consumer, rather than merchant adoption. Furthermore, our theory suggests that
consumers might have to pay interchange fees in early years: early in the evolution of
debit cards, there was a higher adoption cost km for merchants relative to consumers
as merchants had to install new card terminals, while consumers were endowed with
debit cards through their banks’ delivery to them of ATM cards (which then could
function as debit cards). Consequently, our model would suggest that consumers had
to bear a larger share of the card service costs. Later on, as the merchants’ adoption
cost km declined (as general purpose credit and debit card terminals became avail-
able, and terminals fell in cost) more card cost was shifted to the merchants and the
interchange fees could reverse its direction.
Second, why haven’t the interchange fee paid by merchants fallen rapidly with the
27technology progress in the U.S. as well as worldwide?
Our theory suggests it might be explained by several factors: (1) the skewed
distribution of income leads to relative price declines for consumers over time as costs
of provision fall; (2) an increase in monopoly power as the card industry matures
may slow down the reduction of card service fees; (3) increasing skewness in the
distribution of merchant sizes may cause merchants to bear more card service costs
relative to consumers. We believe that all factors matter given the observations that
the concentration of payment card networks has been increasing, and at the same
time, the card networks rely more and more on the consumer rebates to boost the
card usage.
Another contribution of our theory to empirical issues is related to the relatively
low interchange fees charged to grocery stores and gas stations in the U.S. relative
to department stores. We would suggest that grocery stores and gas stations suﬀer
higher adoption costs of accepting electronic payment cards relative to department
stores, for example, as grocery stores and gas stations must install terminals in many
more locations per dollar of sales when compared with department stores. As those
particular merchants’ adoption costs are higher, the consumer bears a higher share
of the payment card costs in those venues than in the department stores.
4F i n a l R e m a r k s
We have provided an alternative microstructure of two-sided markets to study the
pricing, adoption and use of payment devices, in which we emphasize the roles that
consumers’ income distribution and merchants’ size heterogeneity play in adopting
new payment devices. Unlike many existing studies, we assume a competitive econ-
omy where both merchants and consumers behave nonstrategically. The richness of
28the strategic approach is sacriﬁced in favor of a focus on the interplay between indi-
vidual ﬁrm and consumer decision-making and aggregate industry characteristics. As
a result, our model provides a convenient framework to study evolution of the pay-
ment industry both in the short run (network “chicken-egg” dynamics) and long-run
(dynamics due to cost and income changes), and oﬀers some further insights into the
related competition policy issues.
Our analyses show that consumer income, adoption cost, and market structure
each play important roles in determining the pricing and usage of payment devices.
In particular, when applied to the payment card industry, our ﬁndings suggest that
both the increasing concentration of payment card networks, decreases in the costs
of adopting payment cards by consumers, and increasing skewness in the ﬁrm size
distribution may help explain the puzzles surrounding interchange fees. Furthermore,
our model focuses particular attention on adoption costs in explaining the dynamics
of the direction of interchange fees in the U.S. debit card industry, and in the array
of interchange fees chosen by card networks in diﬀerent industries.
We suggest several extensions of the model. First, we may introduce sunk costs
of adopting the payment devices for merchants and consumers to further address the
dynamics of adoption and pricing. Second, we may model explicitly the competition
among payment networks.
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Simulation: Exponentially Distributed Merchant Size and Exponentially Distributed Consumer Income